





lie% questions% about% a% network% of% constitutional% relationships% between% the% monarchy% and% the%
executive,%constitutional%convention%and%constitutional% law,% the%executive%and%the%courts,% ‘regular’%
courts%and%tribunals%and,%ultimately,%between%several%fundamental%constitutional%principles.%It%is%the%
range%and%depth%of%those%questions,%together%with%the%disparate%answers%given%to%them%by%a%divided%







the% Supreme% Court% in% Evans.% After% the% relevant% Departments% declined% —% citing% public6interest%
grounds%—%to%release%the%memos,%Evans%complained%to%the%Information%Commissioner,%who%upheld%
the% Departments’% decisions.% However,% in% a% subsequent,% path6breaking% judgment,% the%
Commissioner’s% decisions% were% overturned% on% appeal% by% the% Upper% Tribunal.% Following% detailed%
consideration% of% constitutional% conventions% pertaining% to% the% role% of% the% heir% to% the% throne,4%the%
Tribunal%held%that%the%public%interest%in%revealing%the%nature%and%extent%(if%any)%of%Charles’s%influence%




for% the% opinion% that% non6disclosure%would% not% be% unlawful,% the%Government% sought% to% nullify% the%





2%This%article% is%concerned%with%only%the%domestic6law%point%that%fell% for%determination% in%Evans.% It%does%
not% address% a% separate% ground,% concerning% EU% law,% on% which% the% Attorney6General% (unsuccessfully)%
appealed%to%the%Supreme%Court.%%
3%Although% it% turns% out% that% the% letters% that% were% the% subject% of% the% freedom6of6information% requests%
were%in%fact%typewritten.%%





Attorney6General% went% on% to% argue% that% engaging% in% this% form% of% advocacy% formed% an% aspect% of%





The% question% with% which% Evans' is% centrally% concerned% is% the% extent% to% which% it% is% legally% and%
constitutionally% legitimate% for% a' court' exercising' powers' of' judicial' review% to% strike% down% a%
Government'Minister’s%decision%made%under%powers%granted%by%Parliament% in%order%to%overturn%an%
independent'judicial'tribunal’s%judgment.%The%case%thus%features%four%institutional%actors%drawn%from%
across% the% three% branches% of% government.% And%while% Evans' is% ostensibly% about% the% extent% of% the%
relevant%actors’%respective%powers,% it% is%more%fundamentally%about%the%meaning%and% interaction%of%
the% three% fundamental% principles% —% the% rule% of% law,% the% sovereignty% of% Parliament% and% the%









text,% but% of% the% way% in% which% other% constitutional% principles% operate% upon% it% and% influence% its%
construction.% For% example,% the% rule% of% law% jealously% guards% the% judicial% role% as% arbiter% of% legal%
disputes% and% therefore% inevitably% views%with% suspicion% the%notion%of% executive%override%of% judicial%
authority.%Yet%the%rule%of%law%arguably%also%views%with%suspicion%judicial%intransigence%in%the%face%of%
clear%legal%provisions%enshrined%in%an%Act%of%Parliament.%It%is%simplistic,%therefore,%to%suppose%that%the%




But% if% that% power% has% been% conferred% in% the% first% place% by% legislation% enacted% by% Parliament,% the%
separation%of%powers%may%be%understood%to%require%a%degree%of%respect%for%Parliament’s%legislative%
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entitlement% to% allocate% authority% that% arises% pursuant% to% one% of% its% statutory% schemes,% and% a%
commensurate%degree%of%respect%for%executive%judgements%rendered%under%such%schemes.%%
Each%of% the%constitutional%principles% in%play% in%Evans' is% thus%multifaceted%and%complex.%At% least% to%




interpretive% process,% which% will% itself% be% informed% by% (among% other% things)% other% relevant%
constitutional%principles.%In%this%sense,%the%basic%architecture%of%the%constitution%consists%of%a%series%
of% relational% principles.% They% make% subtle,% overlapping,% sometimes6contradictory,% sometimes6
complementary%claims.%None%of%them%stands%for%a%simple%proposition,%and%the%degree%of%complexity%
that% they% exhibit% when% viewed% in% isolation% is% multiplied% when% they% are% —% as% they% must% be% —%
conceived% of% in% relational% terms.% For% this% reason,% a% large% part% of% the% complexity% of% constitutional%
adjudication% in% cases% such% as% Evans% derives% from% the% need% to% determine% not% simply% what% these%
fundamental%principles%mean,%but%how%they%interact%with,%qualify%and%inform%prevailing%conceptions%
of%one%another.%Unsurprisingly,%there%is%considerable%scope%for%differences%of%view%in%relation%to%such%
matters,% as% Evans' amply% attests.% Those% differences% are%manifested% not% only% by% the% very% different%
positions% adopted% by% the% majority% and% minority% judges,% but% by% highly% significant% differences% of%













In% approaching% the% central% question%—%whether% the% Attorney6General% had% established% that% there%






the% first%point,% the%default% status%of%Wednesbury' review10%is% increasingly%questionable.11%%As% to% the%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
10%Associated'Provincial'Picture'Houses'Ltd'v'Wednesbury'Corporation%[1948]%1%KB%223.""
11%For% instance,% the% Supreme% Court% indicated% in% Pham' v' Secretary' of' State' for' the' Home' Department'
[2015]%UKSC%19,% [2015]% 1%WLR%1591% that% a% proportionality% standard%may%be% appropriate% and% available%
beyond% the% traditional%provinces%of% EU% law%and%Convention%and% common6law% rights% cases.% Indeed,% the%
second%matter,% it%does%not% follow%that% the%word% ‘reasonable’% in% the% legislation%necessarily% licences%
the%Attorney6General%to% invoke%the%override%power%provided%only%that%to%do%so% is%not%Wednesbury'







It%was% against% this% background% that% Lord%Mance% considered% the%meaning% of% the% term% ‘reasonable%
grounds’,%and%so%the%operative%standard%of%review.%Endorsing%(at% least% implicitly)%certain%aspects%of%
Lord%Neuberger’s%view,%Lord%Mance%said% that% there% is%an% incongruity%—%which% is% ‘if% anything%more%
marked%in%the%case%of%a%court%of%record%like%the%Upper%Tribunal’%—%entailed%by%‘a%minister%or%officer%
of%the%executive,%however%distinguished,%overriding%a%judicial%decision’.13%Such%incongruity%arises,%as%
noted% above,% because% of% the%prima' facie' tension% between% executive% override% of% judicial% decisions%
and%key%aspects%of%the%rule6of6law%and%separation6of6powers%principles.%This%led%Lord%Mance%to%the%
conclusion% that% the% reasonable6grounds% criterion% in% the% statute% was% more% demanding% that% the%
standard% public6law% requirement% of%Wednesbury% reasonableness.% The% statute,% he% said,% erected% ‘a%
higher% hurdle% than% mere% rationality’.14 %In% this% way,% Lord% Mance% permitted% the% fundamental%
constitutional% principles%with%which% the% statutory% scheme,% at% least% taken% at% face% value,% lacked% full%
congruity%to%shape%the%construction%of%that%scheme,%thus%facilitating%the%adoption%of%a%more%exacting%
conception%of%reasonableness.%%
Although% Lord% Mance’s% bottom% line% was% that% something% more% than% conventional% rationality% is%
required,% further% nuance%was% added% to%his% analysis% by% the%distinction%he%drew%between%executive%
override%on%the%basis%of%disagreement%with%the%Tribunal%concerning%(a)%findings%of%fact%or%law%and%(b)%




more% drastic% reading% of% the% statute.15%As% to% the% latter,% however,% Lord%Mance% considered% that% the%
weighing% of% competing% interests% was% ‘contemplated’% by% the% Act% and% would% pass% muster% on% the%
reasonable6grounds%test%if%‘properly%explained’%and%accompanied%by%‘solid%reasons’.16%%
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This% distinction% reflects% particular% understandings% of% the% respective% roles% of% the% judiciary% and% the%
executive%under%the%separation%of%powers,%reserving%greater%latitude%to%the%executive%in%relation%to%
matters% of% public% policy% upon% which% it% may% claim% special% authority.% In% this% way,% Lord% Mance’s%
approach% tracks% considerations% that% underpin% the% doctrine% of% curial% deference% that% shapes%
substantive% judicial% review,%albeit% that%such%considerations%play%out% in%Evans' in%an%usually%complex%








not% concern% the%weighing% of% public% interests%—% to% apply% the% clearest6possible6justification% test,% it%
proved% to% be% exceptionally% demanding.% Even% though% the% Attorney6General% supplied% substantial%
reasons% for% his% decision,% Lord% Mance% judged% them% insufficient% because% they% failed% to% disclose%
adequate% engagement% with,% or% ‘give% any% real% answer% to’,% % the% ‘closely% reasoned% analysis’% of% the%
Upper% Tribunal.17%Lord%Mance’s% approach% thus% set% the%bar% very%high% indeed,% enabling% the% court% to%
treat% as% inadequate% reasons% for% the% exercise% of% the% override% power% that% —% % although% arguably%
reasonable,%in%the%sense%of%being%substantial%and%not%obviously%illogical%—%were%not%considered%to%be%
sufficiently%convincing.%%
The% primary% point% of% contention% as% between% Lord% Mance% and% the% dissentients% was% an% issue% of%
characterization,% the%dissentients%concluding%that%the%disagreement%between%the%Attorney6General%
and% the%Upper%Tribunal%concerned%not%matters%of% fact%or% law%but% the%weighing%of%public% interests.%
However,%the%difference%between%Lord%Mance%and%the%dissentients%arguably%goes%deeper%than%this.%
Lord%Mance%agreed%with% Lord%Wilson% that% the%weighing%of%public% interests% is% a% function%which% the%
legislation%contemplates%will%be%performed%by%the%Government.%As%such,%Lord%Mance%accepted%that%a%
Ministerial%decision%about%the%weighing%of%such%interests%would%be%lawful% if% ‘properly%explained’%by%
reference% to% ‘solid% reasons’.18%However,% the%extent% to%which% Lords%Mance%and%Wilson%are% really% in%
agreement%on%this%point% is%questionable.%A%requirement%to%supply%reasons%that%are%‘solid’% implies%a%
qualitative% assessment% of% them% that% transcends% standard% rationality% review% which,% at% least% in% its%
orthodox%manifestation,%is%concerned%only%with%the%detection%of%decisions%that%are%so%unreasonable%
as%to%defy%logic%or%basic%tenets%of%morality.19%Certainly,%Lord%Neuberger%took%Lord%Mance’s%approach%
to% scrutiny,% even% in% relation% to% the%weighing%of% public% interests,% to%be% a% robust%one,% saying% that% it%
would%‘normally%be%very%hard%for%[the%executive]%to%justify%differing%from%a%tribunal%decision%on%the%
balancing%exercise%on%Lord%Mance’s%analysis’.20%In%contrast,%Lord%Wilson%said%that%the%question%for%the%
court% was% simply% ‘whether% the% grounds% which% formed% [the% Attorney6General’s]% opinion% were%









—% applied,% thereby% making% the% override% power,% at% least% when% exercised% on% the% basis% of% a%
disagreement%as%to%the%weighing%of%public%interests,%a%generous%one.%%
What%accounts%for%the%different%positions%occupied%by%Lord%Mance%and%by%the%dissentients?%Why%do%
they% appear% to% disagree% about% the%meaning% of% the% statutory% term% ‘reasonable% grounds’% and% (as% a%
result)% the% standard% of% judicial% scrutiny% that% should% apply%when% determining% the% adequacy% of% the%













importance’,% he% emphasized% that% an% ‘integral% part’% of% that% principle% is% that% ‘courts% give% effect% to%
Parliamentary% intention’.27%On% this% analysis,% there% was% no% warrant% for% rendering% the% reasonable6
grounds%test%more%demanding%than%it%appeared%at%face%value.%%
In% contrast,% Lord%Mance’s% approach% to% the% statute% and% to% the% reviewing% court’s% role% under% it%was%




intensive%review%of% its%exercise%connoting%not% that% the%reviewing%court%enjoys%particular% legitimacy%














the% constitutional% environment% that% the%FoIA% inhabits,% and,% in%particular,% the%extent% to%which% that%
environment% is%sufficiently%normatively%rich%to% justify%departure%from%the%view%—%which% itself%rests%
on%(different)%normative%considerations%—%that%courts%should%only%give%effect%to%the%‘plain%words’%of%
legislation.% Precisely% the% same% point% of% contestation% explains% the% disagreement% between% Lord%
Neuberger%on%the%one%hand%and%Lords%Mance,%Hughes%and%Wilson%on%the%other.%This%disagreement,%
however,% plays% out% on% a% much% broader% constitutional% canvas,% being% concerned% not% with% the%
appropriate% depth% of% judicial% scrutiny% (which% is% itself,% admittedly,% an% ultimately% constitutional%
question)% but% with% the% deployment% of% normative% principles% so% as% to% interpretively% neutralise%
unconstitutional% executive% authority.% To% put% the% matter% in% blunter% terms,% whereas% Lord% Mance%
utilised%administrative6law%instruments%in%order%to%narrow%the%override%power,%Lord%Neuberger%used%
constitutional6law%tools%to%eviscerate%it.%This%distinction%reflects%the%differing%extents%to%which%Lords%
Neuberger% and%Mance%were% prepared% to% permit% fundamental% constitutional% principles% to% operate%
upon%the% interpretive%process.%While,%as%we%have%seen,%Lord%Mance%was%not%unsympathetic%to%the%
normative%claims%made%by% the%separation6of6powers%and% rule6of6law%principles,%he%opted% to% invest%











as%he% saw% it,% of% an%executive6override%power% front%and% centre.%A%power%enabling% the%executive% to%
override% a% judicial% decision%with%which% it% disagreed%would,% he% said,% be% ‘unique% in% the% laws% of% the%
United% Kingdom’% and%would% ‘cut% across% two% constitutional% principles% which% are% also% fundamental%
components%of% the% rule%of% law’29%—%namely,% that% judicial%decisions% ‘cannot%be% ignored%by%anyone’,%
‘least% of% all% …% the% executive’,% and% that% executive% action,% ‘subject% to% jealously% guarded% statutory%
exceptions’,%must% be% subject% to% judicial% scrutiny.30%Lord%Neuberger’s% view%was% that% broad%override%
powers%would%‘flout%…%the%first%principle’%and%‘stand%…%the%second%principle%on%its%head’.31%%
These%considerations%led%Lord%Neuberger%to%perform%upon%the%Act%what%can%only%be%described%—%not%
necessarily% pejoratively%—% as% radical% interpretive% surgery% pursuant% to% the% principle% of% legality.% In%







concluding% that% s%53%of% the%FoIA%would%be% capable%of%having% the% ‘remarkable%effect’%urged%by% the%
Attorney6General%only% if% the% text%provided% for% such%an%effect% in% terms% that%were% ‘crystal% clear’.35%It%
followed%that%the%legislation%did%not%permit%a%member%of%the%executive%to%override%an%Upper%Tribunal%
decision%whenever%he%or%she%took%‘a%different%view’.36%However,%Lord%Neuberger%went%much%further%
than%merely% ruling% out% the% assignment% to% the% executive% of% carte' blanche'override% powers.% Rather%
than% holding% that% s% 53,% properly% construed,% did% not% permit% override% whenever% the% executive%
disagreed% with% the% Tribunal,% he% concluded% that% the% power% could% be% exercised% only% in% two% highly%
limited% and% unlikely% sets% of% circumstances% —% namely,% in% the% event% of% ‘a% material% change% of%
circumstances%since%the%tribunal%decision’%or%if%‘the%decision%of%the%tribunal%was%demonstrably%flawed%
in%fact%or%in%law’.37%This%led%Lord%Neuberger%to%conclude%that%it%is%‘not%reasonable’%for%the%Attorney6





opinion% based% upon% otherwise6reasonable% grounds% will% not% satisfy% the% legislation% because,% as%
construed% by% Lord% Neuberger,% the% existence% of% one% of% the% exceptional% circumstances% is% a%
precondition%for%the%existence%of%reasonable%grounds%in'the'statutory'sense.%'%
Neither% Lord%Mance%nor% the%dissentients%were%prepared% to% subscribe% to% this% construction%of% s% 53.%
Lord%Mance% considered% that% s% 53% ‘must% have% been% intended% by% Parliament% to% have,% and% can% and%
should%be%read%as%having,%a%wider%potential%effect’%than%that%which%Lord%Neuberger’s%interpretation%
afforded% it.40%Lord% Hughes% went% further:% Parliament% had% ‘plainly% shown’% its% intention,41%and% Lord%
Neuberger’s% construction% was% ‘simply% too% highly% strained’:42%it% rendered% ‘vestigial’% the% ‘generally%
expressed% power’% conferred% by% s% 53.43%Meanwhile,% Lord% Wilson’s% critique% was% nothing% short% of%




















it% is%comparable%to%the%radical% implications%that%the%House%of%Lords’% judgment% in%Anisminic'had%for%
the%ouster%provision%contained%in%s%4(4)%of%the%Foreign%Compensation%Act%1950.47%This%indicates%that,%
for% Lord% Neuberger,% the% pull% of% constitutional% principles% favouring% judicial% independence% and% the%
inviolability% of% judicial% decisions% is% very% strong% indeed.% To% some% extent,% this% can% be% regarded% as%
evidence%of%the%tension%that%exists%in%this%context%between%those%principles%and%(depending%upon%the%
uses%to%which%it%is%put)%parliamentary%sovereignty.%However,%the%matter%is%not%as%straightforward%as%
that,% for% it%also% reveals% that%Lord%Neuberger’s%understanding%of% those%other%principles% itself%differs%
from% the% understandings% of% Lords% Mance,% Hughes% and% Wilson.% For% instance,% the% four% judgments%
reflect%a%spectrum%of%judicial%opinion%concerning%the%separation%of%powers%and,%in%particular,%about%
the% relative% weight% to% be% ascribed% to% those% aspects% of% the% principle% that% respectively% favour% (a)%
judicial%deference%(by%a%reviewing%court)%to%executive%decision6making%and%(b)%executive%respect%for%
and% compliance% with% the% decisions% of% independent% judicial% bodies..% For% Lord% Mance,% the% latter%
consideration%impacted%upon%the%former,% judicial%scrutiny%of%the%quality%of%the%executive’s%decision%
being%heightened%by%the%fact%that,%in%the%first%place,%that%decision%chafed%against%that%aspect%of%the%
separation% of% powers% which% favours% the% inviolability% of% judicial% decisions.% In% contrast,% for% Lord%
Neuberger,% any% question% of% judicial% deference% to% executive% decision6making% under% s% 53% was%
foreclosed% by% means% of% the% priority% accorded% to% the% inviolability% consideration,% the% scope% of% the%
power%being%construed%in%such%narrow%terms%as%to%reduce%the%range%of%circumstances%in%which%the%
power%could%be%exercised%(and%the%executive’s%judgment%in%relation%to%its%exercise%given%any%degree%
of% weight% at% all)% almost% to% vanishing% point.% In% this% way,% Lords% Mance% and% Neuberger% assigned%
different%weights%to%distinct%aspects%of%the%separation%of%powers.%
That% said,% their% approaches% are% also% distinguished% by% the% extent% to%which% they%were% prepared% to%
permit% that% principle,% along%with% the% rule% of% law,% to% shape% the% interpretation% of% the% statute.% Lord%
Neuberger’s%construction%is%undeniably%strangulated,%the%interpretations%of%the%other%Justices%being%




their% content.% That% obligation% lies% at% the% heart% of% the% notion% of% parliamentary% sovereignty,% any%
qualification% of% the% obligation% being% an% apparent% repudiation% of% the% sovereignty% principle% itself.%
However,% the%significance%of% the%obligation%can%meaningfully%be%understood%only% in% the% light%of% its%
content.%And%whatever%the%content%of%the%obligation%might%be,%it%self6evidently%does%not%connote%a%




presented% as% an% example% of% judicial% disobedience% to% statute,% not% least% because% it% is% perceived% to% have%
rendered%the%preclusive%clause%nugatory,%it%did%not%in%fact%—%at%the%time%Anisminic'was%decided%—%have%
such% an% effect% since% it% preserved% the% capacity% of% the% ouster% clause% to% preclude% judicial% intervention% in%
respect% of% non6jurisdictional% errors% on% the% face% of% the% record.% It% is% arguable% that% Lord% Neuberger’s%
construction% of% s% 53% of% the% FoIA% rendered% it% at% least% as,% and% perhaps% more,% ‘vestigial’% than% did% the%
Appellate%Committee’s%interpretation%of%the%ouster%in%Anisminic.%




judicial% obligation% implicit% in% the% principle.% Unless% the% obligation% to% enforce% legislation% is% to% be%
emptied%of%any%meaningful%content,%a%point%must%come%at%which%the%statutory%text%is%so%clear%as%to%
preclude%a%given% ‘interpretation’,%even% if%competing%constructions%would%accommodate%rule6of6law%
or% separation6of6powers% considerations% less% fully.% The% obligation,% after% all,% is% to% interpret% the%
statutory%provision,%not%to%treat%it%as%an%essentially%blank%canvas%on%which%to%project%constitutional%




On% the% face% of% it,% the% crossing% of% that% Rubicon% (if% indeed% it% was% crossed)% is% itself% constitutionally%
offensive% to% the% principle% of% parliamentary% sovereignty,% since% it% implies% a% failure% to% discharge% the%
obligation%to%enforce%legislation%that%is%its%very%essence.%Yet%such%judicial%interventions%may%take%on%a%
different%complexion%if%viewed%in%wider%perspective.%A%decision%like%Evans'is%not%necessarily%the%end%
of% the% road% as% far% as% the% bigger% legal% picture% is% concerned.% It% would,% after% all,% be% possible% for%
Parliament% to% respond% by% amending% s% 53% in% order% to% render% the% override% power% exercisable% in%
circumstances% broader% than% those% contemplated% by% Lord% Neuberger.48%Any% such% revised% provision%
would% itself,% of% course,% be% subject% to% judicial% interpretation,% but,% inevitably,% the% more% clearly%
expressed% a% successor% provision,% the% more% resistant% it% would% be% to% interpretive% reshaping.% The%
approach% to% statutory% construction% disclosed% by% Lord%Neuberger’s% judgment% in%Evans' can% thus% be%
regarded% as% part% of% an% iterative% process:% a% constitutional% dance% in% which% the% courts% either% pull%
Parliament% back% from% a% perceived% constitutional% brink% by% interpretively% neutralising% the% relevant%
provision,%or%force%Parliament%to%confront%the%political%cost%of%retaliation%by%requiring%the%use%of%yet6
starker% terms% if% the% court’s% construction% is% to% be% successfully% displaced% through% legislative%
amendment.49%Viewed%thus,%Lord%Neuberger’s%treatment%of%s%53%may%fairly%be%characterised%as%a%soft%




does% not% follow% that% the% two% are%wholly% irreconcilable.% Indeed,% such% a% judicial% approach%might% be%
considered%the%ultimate%illustration%of%the%relational%nature%of%the%three%fundamental%principles%that%
form%the%bedrock%of%the%UK’s%constitutional%order,%the%ascription%of%preponderant%weight%to%rule6of6
law% or% separation6of6powers% considerations% in% a% particular% case% being% rescued% from% constitutional%
heterodoxy% by% an% underlying% commitment% to% parliamentary% sovereignty% which% concedes% the%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
48%Indeed,% it% is% reported% at% the% time% of% writing% that% the% Government% is% contemplating% legislation% that%





possibility%of% legislative%override.% In%this%way,%each%of%the%fundamental%principles% is% invested%with%a%
finite%degree%of%elasticity,%the%capacity%of%the%rule%of%law%and%the%separation%of%powers%to%qualify%the%
courts’% commitment% to% the% enforcement% of% legislation% being% itself% qualified% by% the% longstop%
possibility%of%Parliament’s% standing%upon% its% sovereign% right% to%have% the% last% (or% at% least% a% further)%
word.% The% untidiness% of% the% constitutional% order% implied% by% this% analysis% may% be% inherently%
unappealing.%But%such%untidiness%is%inevitable%in%a%system%in%which%the%rule%of%law,%the%separation%of%
powers%and%the%sovereignty%of%Parliament%each%rightly%assert%their%fundamentality,%but%in%which%(for%
the%time%being,%at%least)%ultimate%priority%is%conceded%to%the%latter%%
